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The Supreme Court is now considering the case of Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. Oracle has argued that Google infringed its copyright
in computer software, but a jury found that Google’s use was not infringing
under the fair use doctrine. The Federal Circuit reversed the jury verdict
under a de novo standard of review. I have argued that this reversal violates
the Seventh Amendment.
Seventh Amendment rights depend on whether an issue would have
been decided by a jury in English law courts during the late 1700s. My
argument is that in the 1785 English case of Sayre v. Moore, the court required a jury to decide an issue that is analogous to fair use, so the Seventh
Amendment applies to Google’s jury verdict. But some have criticized my
interpretation of Sayre, construing it instead to be about other copyright
doctrines, such as the fact-expression dichotomy or independent creation.
This Essay responds to those criticisms. It analyzes the text of the Sayre
opinion and makes observations based on that analysis. The Essay concludes that the issue put to the jury in Sayre was closely analogous to the
modern issue of fair use.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court will be deciding a copyright case this term, Google
LLC v. Oracle America, Inc, which concerns Google’s use of software that Oracle holds a copyright in. A jury found for Google on the issue of fair use, and the
Federal Circuit reversed that verdict under a de novo standard of review. 1 Recently I wrote an article and submitted an amici brief arguing that the Federal
Circuit’s reversal violated the Seventh Amendment. 2
Since I wrote the article, some have challenged my interpretation of a key
case in the argument—Sayre v. Moore. 3 Sayre is a 1785 English case in which a
* Ray Taylor Fair Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. A draft of this Essay was presented
at the Chicago Kent College of Law, 2020 Supreme Court IP Review: Preview of Google v. Oracle.
1. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
2. Ned Snow, Who Decides Fair Use—Judge or Jury?, 94 WASH. L. REV. 275 (2019); Brief of Amici
Curiae Civ Pro, IP & Legal History Professors in support of Petitioner, Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., No. 18956 (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-956/127739/20200107121121412_39
073%20pdf%20Snow.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7G3-GMWN].
3. (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139–40 n.(b); 1 East 358, 361–62.
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jury sitting in a court of law decided an issue closely analogous to fair use. This
conclusion is crucial to my Seventh Amendment argument because the constitutional requirement for deference to a jury verdict depends on whether a jury
would have heard the issue (or an analogous one) in an English court of law at
the time of the Seventh Amendment. 4 Some, however, have cast doubt on my
interpretation. They have suggested that the jury issue in Sayre did not concern
fair use, but rather dealt with an issue more closely akin to the fact-expression
dichotomy, 5 or alternatively, an issue about whether the defendant did in fact
copy from the plaintiff’s work. 6 Respecting these contrary interpretations, I now
further analyze the reasoning of Sayre to support my interpretation that the issue
in Sayre is analogous to the modern doctrine of fair use.
Part I sets forth the text of the legal reasoning in Sayre v. Moore. Part II
provides a textual analysis of that reasoning. Part III makes observations based
on the entire passage and the context of the time period.
I.

THE OPINION

The issue in Sayre concerned whether a defendant, who had copied sea
charts of the plaintiff, had infringed the plaintiff’s copyright. The case arose in a
court of law, and the opinion was written by Lord Mansfield. The entirety of
Mansfield’s analysis consists of the fifteen sentences quoted below. These sentences, however, do not include the evidence of the case which is recited above
the analysis in the opinion. For ease of reference, I have numbered each sentence:
[1] The rule of decision in this case is a matter of great consequence to
the country.
[2] In deciding it we must take care to guard against two extremes
equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed
their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of
their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other,
that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress
of the arts be retarded.
[3] The Act that secures copy-right to authors guards against the piracy
of the words and sentiments; but it does not prohibit writing on the
same subject.
[4] As in the case of histories and dictionaries: in the first, a man may
give a relation of the same facts, and in the same order of time; in the
latter an interpretation is given of the identical same words.
4. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 US. 340, 347‒48 (1998).
5. See Justin Hughes, The Respective Role of Judges and Juries in Fair Use, 58 HOUS. L. REV. 5‒7 (forthcoming 2020).
6. See Supplemental Brief of Respondent at 9, Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., No 18-956 (Aug. 7,
2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-956/149667/20200807132108693_2020.08.07%20Oracle%20Supplemental%20Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/JNB9-LLPF] (“[T]he sole question the court identified for
the jury was whether the substantial similarity between maps was due to copying, versus simply reflecting the
same geographic elements that anyone is free to document.”).
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[5] In all these cases the question of fact to come before a jury is,
whether the alteration be colourable or not?
[6] there must be such a similitude as to make it probable and reasonable to suppose that one is a transcript of the other, and nothing more
than a transcript.
[7] So in the case of prints, no doubt different men may take engravings
from the same picture.
[8] The same principle holds with regard to charts; whoever has it in
his intention to publish a chart may take advantage of all prior publications.
[9] There is no monopoly of the subject here, any more than in the
other instances; but upon any question of this nature the jury will decide whether it be a servile imitation or not.
[10] If an erroneous chart be made, God forbid it should not be corrected even in a small degree, if it thereby become more serviceable
and useful for the purposes to which it is applied.
[11] But here you are told, that there are various and very material alterations.
[12] This chart of the plaintiffs’ is upon a wrong principle, inapplicable
to navigation.
[13] The defendant therefore has been correcting errors, and not servilely copying.
[14] If you think so, you will find for the defendant; if you think it is a
mere servile imitation, and pirated from the other, you will find for the
plaintiffs.
[15] Verdict for the defendant. 7
II. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
Mansfield starts broad. He sets forth the importance of the case in Sentences 1 and 2, explaining that this case concerns a tension between providing a
“reward” to “men of ability” for their “just merits” and allowing for “improvements” that would benefit “the world” and further “the progress of the arts.” 8 In
other words, he identifies a tension between enforcing the copyright so as to reward authors for their labor and allowing others to improve upon existing works
so as to further societal progress.
Although these sentences do not speak directly to whether the case concerns fair use, it is notable that fair use does raise this tension that Mansfield
identifies (as does the fact-expression doctrine). Notably, though, this tension
would not be present if the issue of the case concerned whether the defendant
had in fact copied from the plaintiff. The issue of whether copying actually occurred does not raise concern over protecting “improvements” on existing works.

7.
8.

(1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.(b).
Id.
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Hence, Sentence 2 appears inconsistent with an interpretation suggesting that the
case deals with whether copying occurred.
In Sentence 3, Mansfield begins reciting the law. He recounts a principle
with which no one would disagree: the Act’s prohibition of piracy does not prevent two people from independently writing on the same subject. Today we
would label this principle independent creation.
Mansfield continues this line of thought in Sentence 4. He gives two examples of independent creation: independently created histories and independently
created dictionaries. Two men might write historical accounts using the same
facts and order of events, and they may also write dictionaries that define the
same set of words. There is no doubt that these examples illustrate independent
creation.
In Sentence 5, Mansfield poses the question that would come before a jury
in these sorts of independent-creation cases: “whether the alteration be colourable or not.” Notably, the meaning of colourable here is deceptive or specious—
an older meaning in the law. 9 With this understanding, we see that in these independent-creation cases, the jury decides whether a second author has in fact made
his own creation or, alternatively, has made some specious changes to the first
author’s work so as to make it look like it is his own independent creation.
I pause here to ask a question. Why is Mansfield talking about independent
creation at all? The opinion’s recitation of evidence indicates that the defendant
was not arguing independent creation. Specifically, in reciting the evidence before the court, the opinion states: “It appeared in evidence that the defendant had
taken the body of his publication from the work of the plaintiffs, but that he had
made many alterations and improvements thereupon.” 10 Likewise, a witness for
the defendant had testified: “That there were very material errors in the plaintiffs’
maps. . . . That most of these, as well as errors in the foundings, were corrected
by the defendant.” 11 Simply put, this case could not have been about whether
copying actually occurred. Rather, it was about whether the defendant made improvements that would suggest against a finding of piracy. Why, then, is Mansfield bringing up the issue of determining whether copying had occurred, i.e.,
independent creation?
The answer is that Mansfield begins by reciting a principle with which everyone agrees (independent creation), along with its corresponding jury issue
(whether a defendant made specious alterations) in order to derive a related but
distinct legal principle. He begins his move into this distinct legal principle in
Sentence 6.
At first glance, Sentence 6 seems to straightforwardly answer the question
posed in Sentence 5: the way to discern between an independent creation and a
mere specious alteration is to identify “such a similitude” between the two works
at issue that the defendant’s must be a “transcript” of the plaintiff’s. But then
9. Colourable, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (entry 2.a) (“Intended to deceive or to conceal a
true purpose; fraudulent; feigned, pretended, spurious.”).
10. (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 n.(b).
11. Id. at 140 n.(b).
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Mansfield adds a rather telling clause at the end of Sentence 6: “and nothing
more than a transcript.” 12 This “nothing more” clause is puzzling, for Mansfield
has set up that clause so that it will introduce an idea that contrasts with creating
a similar transcript. Given that independent creation is the doctrine that Mansfield has taught in the prior three sentences, we would expect Mansfield at this
point in Sentence 6 to refer to an independent creation as the contrasting alternative to works that are of “such a similitude.” Yet if the clause were describing an
independent creation, it would be describing how a second work would be less
than a mere transcript. Only if the second work were less than a transcript would
the two copies lack sufficient similarity, thereby implying that the second work
is an independent creation. Mansfield goes the opposite direction. He gives as a
contrast to an infringing transcript the possibility of something “more” being
added to the transcript. The word more implies that the second work constitutes
the transcript plus something else. Putting this together, we see that Mansfield is
suggesting that in contrast to copying that is an infringement, copying that adds
something else would not be infringing. Stated differently, the nothing-more
clause does not contrast with the act of copying, but rather, with the ultimate
conclusion of infringement. Mansfield is telling us that adding more to the transcript copy is not infringement.
Sentence 7 continues this principle that Mansfield introduces in the nothing-more clause by provides validating examples. This continuation of thought
is apparent as he starts Sentence 7 by stating, “So in the case of prints,” which
indicates that he is now applying the principle in Sentence 6 to an example involving prints. That example is informative: “different men may take engravings
from the same picture.” 13 Men may copy the expression (not merely the fact) of
a picture to create their own engravings of the picture. Plainly, this example is
intended to illustrate the case in which infringement would not occur, or in the
words of Sentence 6, where a copy constitutes “more than a transcript.” The reason, then, that men can take expression from an existing picture is because the
process of engraving the picture requires them to add something more to the picture.
Perhaps, though, Mansfield is instead illustrating that two men may create
their similar engravings independently without infringing, even though they
share the same source. That is to say, could Mansfield’s example in Sentence 7
be returning us to independent creation? The answer lies in Sentence 8. There,
Mansfield explains that he is now applying “[t]he same principle” from Sentence
7 to the sort of expression under consideration in the case before him, sea charts.
He applies that same principle by declaring that whoever intends to create a chart
may “take advantage of all prior publications.” 14 In other words, people may
copy existing works without infringing. Sentence 8 thus implies that the principle
discussed in Sentence 7 could not be an independent creation. In Sentence 7,
Mansfield must be talking about copying the prior expression (i.e., the picture).
12.
13.
14.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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Sentence 8 is further notable because it does not suggest that a person must
copy only unprotected portions of a prior publication. Mansfield provides no
qualification that would exclude copying expression. Therefore, especially when
viewed in conjunction with copying a picture (i.e., expression) in Sentence 7,
Sentence 8 does not appear to suggest the fact-expression dichotomy.
In Sentence 9, Mansfield begins by reciting the well-established principle
that one cannot monopolize a subject matter. From this premise, one might expect Mansfield to explain independent creation. But once again, he goes a different direction. He proceeds to explain that “the jury will decide whether [the defendant’s copying] be a servile imitation or not.” 15 The meaning for servile here
is “slavish” or “unintelligently close to the . . . original,” as defined in the Oxford
English Dictionary. 16 The jury’s inquiry, then, is not into whether copying occurred, but rather, it is into whether copying occurred in a slavish manner. This
is not an independent-creation inquiry. Moreover, Sentence 9 implies that nonslavish copying would not be infringing. Copying that involves intelligent
thought, resulting in a work that is not too close to the original, would seem permissible under the logic of Sentence 9.
In Sentence 10, Mansfield observes value in the sort of use that the defendant has alleged—specifically, the correction of mistakes on a faulty sea chart.
This observation of Mansfield is consonant with the first factor of the modern
fair use test, which also evaluates the value of the defendant’s use. 17 Sentences
11, 12, and 13 set forth the argument of the defendant that the jury is to consider.
That argument is that the defendant made “various and very material alterations”
(Sentence 11); that the plaintiff’s charts do not allow for proper navigation (Sentence 12); and that the defendant was correcting errors in those charts rather than
slavishly copying (Sentence 13). 18 This argument sounds very much like elements in a modern fair use argument. It touches on the purpose of the defendant’s
use (correcting errors), the transformative nature of the use (making various and
material alterations), and arguably the nature of the plaintiff’s work (faulty for
navigation). 19 Tellingly, these Sentences do not suggest a principle that would
recognize less copyright protection in factual information. Nor do they concern
independent creation. Taken together, Sentences 10-13 represent the analogue to
the modern fair use doctrine.
In Sentence 14, Mansfield charges the members of the jury that if they
“think so,” they should find for the defendant. 20 Importantly, “think so” refers to
the defendant’s arguments set forth in Sentences 11-13. Those arguments, and
only those arguments, are the ones that determine whether the defendant should

15. Id.
16. Servile, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (entry 6) (“Of imitation (esp. in literature and art),
translation, etc.: unintelligently close to the exemplar or original; ‘slavish’. Hence of a person as agent.”).
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (examining “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes”).
18. (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.(b).
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
20. (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.(b).
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be held liable for copying. And as mentioned above, those arguments are closely
akin to the sort that we would find in today’s fair use doctrine.
The last point to note from Mansfield’s opinion arises in Sentences 14 and
3. Sentence 14 indicates that if the jury does not accept the defendant’s arguments in Sentences 11-13, then that conclusion means the defendant’s work is
“pirated.” 21 In other words, if the use is not permissibly fair, it is infringing.
Keeping this in mind, recall that Sentence 3 sets forth the unremarkable proposition that the Act protects against “piracy.” Read together, then, Sentences 14
and 3 make a subtle but important point: the copyright doctrines discussed between Sentences 3 and 14 define whether a defendant has “pirated” a work in
violation of the Act. This point matters a lot. It means that the argument that the
jury considers in Sentences 11-13 determines whether a legal right has been infringed. That is, the fair use principles are defining the legal right. So not only
does Mansfield send the issue to the jury, but he calls out the fact that the issue
determines infringement of a legal right. Put more bluntly, if Sayre is indeed a
fair use case (or its analogue), Sayre satisfies the Seventh Amendment historical
test.
III. OBSERVATIONS
We thus observe that Mansfield begins with a principle that is undeniable—
i.e., independent creation is not a piracy—and ends with a principle that is perhaps less established at the time—i.e., improvements on a plaintiff’s work may
not be a piracy. Starting with independent creation, he moves to similarity that
implies copying, and then transitions to a discussion about copying that adds
something valuable to the original. He points out that both principles call for a
jury to make a judgment about alterations: the independent-creation principle
calls for a judgment about whether alterations are specious, and the non-infringing-improvement principle calls for a judgment about whether alterations are
material. In so many words, he is drawing on independent creation to arrive at a
principle that recognizes non-infringement based on a defendant’s use.
We also observe that in the second half of the opinion, when Mansfield is
applying the law to the facts, he engages in a fair use sort of analysis. The first
factor of the modern fair use doctrine examines “the purpose and character” of a
defendant’s use. 22 Similarly, Mansfield calls for an examination of whether a
defendant’s use would be “more serviceable and useful” (Sentence 10). 23 Furthermore, the first fair use factor requires consideration of whether a defendant’s
use “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering
the first with new expression, meaning, or message.” 24 Mansfield likewise suggests that adding something more to the original, by correcting errors, would not
be infringing (Sentences 6-9). In that regard, he asks the jury to consider whether
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
(1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.(b).
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
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the defendant made “various and very material alterations” to the original
work. 25 In short, Mansfield’s analysis posits that a defendant’s copying of the
plaintiff’s work could be non-infringing depending on the sort of use made. That
sounds a lot like fair use.
Notably, nowhere in the opinion does Mansfield suggest that sea charts receive less protection because of their factual nature. Although he states that
“[t]here is no monopoly of the subject here” (Sentence 9), 26 he never connects
that statement to the factual nature of the charts. There is no mention of the
work’s factual nature as a basis for implying less protection or permissible copying. Yet even if we were to construe this statement to mean that the factual
nature of the charts suggests against infringement, this construction supports the
fair use analysis. The second factor of the modern fair use doctrine examines the
nature of the copyrighted work, including whether that work is more factual than
creative. 27 Hence, if Mansfield were suggesting that the sea charts should receive
less protection because they are factual, this falls in line with fair use.
In the end, Mansfield does not treat this case as turning on the factual nature
of the sea charts. Yet why not? Sea charts are mostly factual, so the fact-expression dichotomy would seem to be the doctrine that he should have employed.
Indeed, it is difficult not to think of Sayre as a fact-expression case. 28 But this is
not a modern case. This is a 1785 case. At that time, copyright gained legitimacy
from Locke’s labor-desert theory. Indeed, Mansfield recites that theory in Sentence 2: “men of ability” who have “employed their time” should “not be deprived of their just merits” or “the reward of their ingenuity and labour.” 29 To be
sure, Lockean theory is on the plaintiff’s side of the Sayre lawsuit. This means
that the strength of the plaintiff’s copyright does not depend on creativity (as it
would today under Feist) as much as it does sweat of the brow. In other words,
the factual nature of the plaintiff’s subject matter does not significantly weaken
the copyright protection (and perhaps not even at all)—unlike it would under
modern precedent. 30 Therefore, it is unsurprising that Mansfield does not rely on
the factual nature of sea charts to determine whether the defendant infringed.
Instead, he relies on the merits of the defendant’s use—what today we call fair
use.
CONCLUSION
Sayre v. Moore applies principles of the modern fair use doctrine to the
facts of the case. It is not a case that applies the fact-expression dichotomy or the
25. (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.(b).
26. Id.
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (examining “the nature of the copyrighted work”); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
28. See Feist Pub’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991).
29. (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.(b).
30. This conclusion draws further support from the 1790 Copyright Act, which lists three categories of
protectable works: maps, charts, and books. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (amended 1831). The
former two categories would receive only thin copyright protection under modern precedent. See Feist, 499 U.S.
at 344‒45, 349.
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independent creation doctrine to the facts. The jury was not charged to evaluate
whether the defendant used unprotected factual elements of the plaintiff’s sea
charts. Nor was the jury charged to consider whether the defendant actually copied those charts. Instead, Mansfield charged the jury to consider the value of the
defendant’s use—correcting errors in faulty sea charts—to determine whether
infringement occurred. That is the only issue that the jury considered. And that
is fair use. 31

31. I respond to three additional points raised against my position. First, evidence outside the case suggests
that Mansfield employed a “special jury”—a group of merchants—in Sayre. See Hughes, supra note 5, at 6
(suggesting that the special jury might detract from a Seventh Amendment argument). Does this fact affect the
Seventh Amendment analysis? Professors William Luneburg and Mark Nordenberg have concluded that this fact
should not affect the analysis. See William V. Luneburg & Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and
Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L.
REV. 887, 903 (1981). In their insightful article, they explain: “the special jury was an acceptable form of jury at
common law and would, therefore, meet the seventh amendment’s historical test.” Id. at 903‒04. They point out
that in 1730, Parliament passed a statute allowing any litigant in a criminal or civil case to request a special jury.
Id. Modern courts have not indicated that a special jury used in the past would be insufficient to trigger a jury
right under the Seventh Amendment today.
Second, Professor Hughes calls attention to a statement by the Lord Chancellor in Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 26
Eng. Rep. 489; 2 Atk. 141. There, a defendant had copied significant portions of a law book and the Lord Chancellor hearing the case in equity refused to send the “factual” issues to a jury. Despite this case having arisen in
equity, Professor Hughes cited this as evidence against the argument that fair use was a legal issue to be tried by
a jury in law courts. Hughes explained that the case “shows only one of England’s most learned jurists opining
that with a copyright infringement case, even in the face of a fair abridgment defense and a request from defendant’s counsel, ‘[t]he court [wa]s not under an indispensable obligation to send all facts to a jury.’” Hughes, supra
note 5, at 11 (quoting Gyles, 2 Atk. 141 at 490–91). Respectfully, I disagree that this statement in Gyles, which
arose in an equitable proceeding, is relevant to the historical test for the Seventh Amendment. The Lord Chancellor’s opinion that a judge sitting in equity should decide an issue (rather than send it to a jury) does not suggest
that a judge sitting in a court of law should do likewise. Indeed, if anything, the Lord Chancellor’s characterization of the issue as factual in nature suggests the opposite conclusion—that if the issue had arisen in a law court,
the jury would have needed to decide it.
Third, Oracle has raised doubt over whether the jury actually decided the infringement issue of fair abridgment
in the case of Roworth v. Wilkes, (1807) 170 Eng. Rep. 889; 1 Camp. 94. Supplemental Brief of Respondent, at
9, Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., No 18-956 (Aug. 7, 2020). As I explained in my earlier article, the case itself
does not speak to the issue. Snow, supra note 2, at 296 n.157. Instead, the English case of Campbell v. Scott,
(1842) 59 Eng. Rep. 784, 787; 11 Sim. 31, 40., provides the answer:
Roworth v. Wilkes was a case in which 75 pages of a treatise consisting of 118 pages were taken and inserted
in a very voluminous work . . . and, although the matter taken formed but a very small proportion of the
work into which it was introduced, the jury found for the Plaintiff, who was the author of the treatise.
Campbell thus states that in Roworth, “the jury found for the Plaintiff,” or in other words, the jury decided the
infringement issue.

